Almost immediately after FEMA released one year late its draft housing strategy, fingers blamed the agency of crafting an inconclusive strategy that delivers an incomplete approach for such a critical issue. From what I have been able to read so far, I agree with most critics that this is a half baked, uncommitted report. But that is precisely the whole point: not until the Federal network takes responsibility, clarifies FEMA's mission, and related excuses, will these reports add much significant substance to the issue. It is not only in the organization recent history that the downfalls of this system are exposed, but in particular as it relates to disaster housing. FEMA both enjoys and suffers the grey zone of its congressional mandate. In order to clarify responsibilities, and future actions, the Stafford Act that legitimizes FEMA is critically what needs to change to start a different process.

The Stafford Act was created in 1988 as an amended version of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 enabling the current procedures, and making a Presidential Disaster Declaration necessary to trigger federal assistance through the affected area. While it is true that it does not offer such a clean cut interpretation, often the Act is used often to shield FEMA from having actual capacity dedicated towards transitional housing and mid to long-term rebuilding. For instance, one of the recurring items in the disaster legislative agenda for the American Institute of Architects is to request congress to amend the Stafford Act "to allow funds to be used for pre- and post-disaster community planning." (2008 PDF) But as often happens with most things labeled disaster, it seems difficult to maintain interest and continuity toward difficult changes that span over rapidly changing organizations and administrations. Severe and iconic disasters such as 911 or Katrina had enough of a cultural impact, and media pull to help push certain initiatives. But even the momentum gained under heavy impact loses traction at some point without the adequate support. Issues around the highly predictable formaldehyde intoxication on FEMA trailers are used as part of a superficial blame game, without actual accountability, or strategies to reform the current procedures and policies.

It is also true that FEMA has suffered a severe brain drain during Bush´s administration. Besides obvious and popular mismanagement, the decision to fold it within other agencies, the budgetary reshuffle around Homeland Security, or the superficial and obsessive dedication to terrorist threats, are sufficient reasons for this demise as exemplified rather well in the years prior to the climax of incompetence that Hurricane Katrina was. I must confess that while I have a few horror stories to share, FEMA had quite a few very capable professionals during the time of the hurricane. However in my limited experience, those where a group of dedicated academic and managerial personnel, some of them quite extraordinary and capable, but that unfortunately had little to do with the inexperienced, unknowledgeable, and overworked personnel that I dealt with at most relief operations on the ground.

It is true that since Katrina FEMA has tried somewhat to clean up its act, with adequate, if relatively minor, interventions in events such as the Iowa floods this year, or its involvement after the Greensburg tornado. But by no means, these can be considered remotely equivalent to the test experienced in 2005, or to the level of research, and knowledge that the agency tried to display and develop until 2000. It is easy to harm such a critical organization as FEMA, lifting it up however becomes a tremendous challenge. Its reputation is severely damaged even within Federal agencies. In the few informal conversations I had with representatives of the Department of Housing regarding precisely this transitional housing topic, and inquiring as to their position to help the region, develop a policy for post disaster housing, and collaborate with FEMA in doing so, there was an evident and absolute lack of desire to be involved with FEMA in any capacity whatsoever. Reputation was often most alluded to, arguing that while the Department of Housing and Urban Development still had some respect from the public, associating itself with FEMA in its current condition would be suicidal, which reminds me why I though of this when I saw the news blaming FEMA for a half baked disaster housing plan.

Will any of this change in a presidential year? Can we help to support the political climate that will engage congress into an actual revision of the Stafford Act with a real bite on post-disaster housing? Will it be a matter of if or when for FEMA to recuperate a sense of the capacity it once was supposed to have? Talking about a multifaceted congressional debate, with dismal political gains in the short term, and intertwined with abysmal bureaucratic ramifications is what few have any desire to face. But until that happens, until we care to talk about the relevant and difficult topics, even if the agency is rebuilt efficiently, the housing responsibilities as it relates to shelter during catastrophic events and how it evolves into transitional and permanent housing, will be largely defective, which in part explains why so much is trying to happen despite FEMA on this front.

Image courtesy of Kevin Spidel